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in Post-Postmodernity’
Jonathan Toms*
One fundament. One ﬁrework. Plant it and retreat. Sadly, the result seems to have been
barely a ﬁzzle. Roger Cooter tried to provoke a debate in these pages about how
‘medico-centric historians’ should engage with what he sees as the fundamentally
‘bio-centric’ contemporary world.
1 Well, I for one feel like I’ve had a ﬁrework stuck up
the centre of my bio-existence, and I intend to return the favour. In truth, I have a lot
of respect for Roger Cooter and his work. But there are fundamental issues in his
article that I think need bringing into relief. They are important and need arguing about.
Let me begin by agreeing with Cooter’s general statement about important elements
of the contemporary world:
...the reconﬁguration of rights and citizenship, the withdrawal of the state from
health and welfare, the creation of commercial spaces beyond academic bioethics,
and the roles of philanthropy and the media in contemporary health and health
education, demand not just new ways of thinking about the present and the






the present. Third, he uses this critique as justiﬁcation for proposing that a
Foucauldian-inspired approach be adopted by medical historians. Fourth, he uses this, in
turn, to argue that historians of medicine can renew their remit by turning away from
their‘traditional’disciplineanditsconcerns,tofocusinsteadonthebiosciencesandbiopo-
litics. There is good reason to pay more attention to the biosciences and biopolitics. But
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done, and his dismissal of any other foci for ‘medico-centric historians’.
Though he proposes a ‘re-radicalisation’ of historical work, Cooter, in fact, begins from
the traditional perspective of the historian. He states that ‘never before has the need
been greater to understand where we’ve come from as a means to obtaining a better
purchase on the place where we’ve arrived’.
3 He looks to the career of the social
history of medicine since the 1970s, and elaborates the conceptual ﬂaws that he
believes have ultimately led to its lack of capacity for serious intellectual and political
engagement.
First of all, we should note that, in his dismissal of the relevance of the social history of
medicine, he lumps together both early examples of the discipline that emerged via econ-
omic history, and social constructionist approaches that emerged later. He describes them
as united by a pretty straightforward notion of oppressors and oppressed; top-down
power and bottom-up resistance; medical agents on the one hand, and the ‘pathologised
and medicalised on the other (especially women, the working class and the mad)’.
4
In part, I agree with him. Some work in the social history of medicine partook of a black
and white division of ‘bad’ doctors and ‘good’ patients, or the medical wielding of power
as necessarily ‘bad’ and resistance to it as necessarily ‘good’. Cooter uses this as a reason
to dismiss this past; I don’t. In truth, it would be a bit of a travesty to reduce the past of
the social history of medicine to that. Where I have criticisms, they focus mainly on the
paternalism inherent in a lot of the social history of medicine. For example, one issue
with the ‘top down power and bottom up resistance’ approach that Cooter highlights
is that so much of the social history of medicine decided who ‘the oppressed’ were
and then spoke for them. While it did help open up and expose imbalances of power,
the social history of medicine often did not notice or engage with imbalances of
power that emanated from its own practice and institutional position. Cooter ignores
this aspect, but despite that, there are many difﬁcult issues here that are still very
much worth engaging with. My criticisms, unlike Cooter’s, do not amount to a dismissal.
I am not saying that the history of medicine was (and still is in many ways) paternalist—
and there is an end of it. On the contrary, I am saying that this was, is, and likely always
will be, an ever-present issue that it is essential to try to engage with, even if it might
never be ‘resolved’. It is the engaging with it that is the point. And it is a fundamental
and ongoing issue. To give just one instance, how do historians deal with this dilemma
of paternalism in regard to their use of the archive?
Cooter, on the other hand, focuses on a different aspect. He lumps all the approaches
associated with the past of the history of medicine together because they share assump-
tions about inequalities of power related to medicine and its recipients. He could criticise
the social history of medicine (whether it be of the ‘earliest’ kind, or of the social con-
structionist kind that emerged a little later) because it wasn’t (and still isn’t) sufﬁciently
nuanced or reﬂective about imbalances of power and their manifestation. But he
doesn’t. This is because the fundamental reason why he unites all the approaches associ-
ated with the social history of medicine is deeper and simpler. The problem for him isn’t
3Cooter 2007, p. 441.
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they were wrong to have oriented their work around a notion of imbalances of power in
the ﬁrst place. I think he is right, on the whole, in his assertion that approaches in the
social history of medicine shared a concern (through its early years, at least) with exposing
inequalities of power in society in as much as they related to medical knowledge and
practice. I think he is wrong to see this as conceptually illegitimate.
The reason Cooter focuses his criticism of the social history of medicine on its attention
to imbalances of power is because he wants to guide the reader, and the history of medi-
cine in general, into taking a Foucauldian position on the nature of power. To put this pos-
ition in a nutshell: the ‘urground’ of everything for Foucault is power/knowledge. Reality
is the ongoing result of power/knowledge combat. So all the concepts that we might try
to hang our analytical hats on must submit to this understanding of how power/knowl-
edge creates reality. What now becomes important is not to use the concepts as a means
to analysis, but to show how these concepts have been produced, and thus have pro-
duced reality.
Using Foucault as paradigmatic, and bringing in other scholars where appropriate,
Cooter relays how such concepts as ‘the social’, ‘the political’ and ‘the cultural’ have
lost ‘discrete analytical power’. Since he is criticising the social history of medicine, he
highlights in particular how ‘the social’ has been revealed as a historical construct.
5
The ‘social body’ has been shown to be, for instance, a discursive construct of the nine-
teenth century. But, as he says, this deconstruction affects wider concepts associated with
all intellectual thought. Indeed he notes that ‘vision’, ‘rationality’ and ‘reality’ itself also
submit to ‘intellectual disembowelling’.
6 So Cooter foregrounds Foucault’s work, in par-
ticular, as central to the exposure of the conceptual inadequacies of the history of medi-
cine. He can now easily move on from here to proposing that a Foucauldian-inspired
approach should be adopted by medical historians.
If there is a key to Cooter’s linkage of his criticism of the social history of medicine, with
his proposal for its re-fashioning, it is this statement, ‘while the category “the patient”
was simply taken for granted, the body of the patient—implicit to all history of
medicine—was left largely unattended’.
7 Turning-points in narratives often rely on
seemingly simple statements like this. To be fair, they are almost impossible to avoid.
But let’s look at this one. At one level, the statement’s power lies in its apparent common-
sense. At this level we might agree; of course the body must be ‘implicit’ to any medical
work. But even at this level we should be wary. All narratives lead you somewhere. Where
is this one leading you? In accepting a ‘basic’ truth of this statement, let’s be sure not to
be dragged into thinking that this is the only thing ‘implicit’ in all history of medicine, or
the only thing worth focusing on. For instance, isn’t ‘knowledge’ at the heart of the
enterprise as well? Isn’t ‘relationship’ too? (Without relationship, there is ‘nothing’
surely?) There must be other examples, but I pick these ones because they are useful
to the points I want to make.
5Cooter 2007, p. 445.
6Cooter 2007, p. 444.
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person might, at some level, take it. The ‘key sentence’suggests that we are returning to
something more fundamental. But that isn’t really the case. Certainly we are not return-
ing to something more reliable and stable; just because ‘the body’seems more immediate
to each of us that doesn’t make it so. And Cooter doesn’t claim this either. In the passages
after what I have called Cooter’s ‘key’sentence, he emphasises that just like, for example,
‘the social’, ‘class’, ‘history’ and ‘power’ (he means power construed in terms of imbal-
ances), ‘the body’ was yet another of those taken-for-granted invariant things. And,
given the Foucauldian approach, it is pretty obvious that Cooter’s description of the pro-
duction of reality through power/knowledge must include ‘the body’. So, if ‘the body’ is
the important thing that has been left largely unattended to all along, how should we
attend to it? The answer is that we are supposed to attend to it, in fact, in the same
way as we are supposed to approach ‘the social’, or ‘the ethical’, or ‘class’. That is, we
are to analyse it and them only in terms of their production by power/knowledge.
What would this history that focuses on ‘the body’ look like? Well, power/knowledge
is everywhere; it makes things up, it makes us up. We are power/knowledge fabrications.
So what ‘we’ must do is attend to the ways in which we are produced. Cooter refers to
Foucault’s concept of biopower to describe this power and how it ‘makes us up’; he says
it is ‘knowledge-producing processes through which institutional practices come to
deﬁne, measure, categorize and construct the body and somatically shape all experience,
meaning and understanding of life’.
8 Now that is a big, big, assertion. Power/knowledge
is everywhere, power/knowledge makes everything up, including the very substance and
experience of each of us. It is impossible to prove, of course. But there are plenty of see-
mingly important conceptual understandings that are impossible to prove. So the further
question should be: is it persuasive? The answer for me is, no.
In a previous article entitled ‘The Disabled Body’, Cooter says that he is:
Accepting that the human body (like everything else) is what it is, and does what it
does ‘because of the categories in which it is conceptualised’, or as Ian Hacking has
put it, we ‘make people up’ by the categories we assign or invent for them.
9
Is this accepted by most people? Should it be? The sociologist David Armstrong, who like-
wise employs a Foucauldian understanding of power/knowledge, appears to take a
similar view. He sums it up in the tidy sentence, ‘It is the thought that constructs the
thinker and the deed that constructs the doer.’
10 I don’t see any reason to accept this.
I don’t see it as intellectually sophisticated either. Nor do I believe that it can be
proved. I can’t resist saying, though, that if it is true, shouldn’t the rest of us just pack
up and go home? If it is that simple, it surely shouldn’t take too long for ‘us’ to be
told the ideas and practices that ‘make us up’ at any given time. Though, come to
think of it, perhaps it’s a bit more complicated: I pick my nose, therefore I am a ‘nose-
picker’, so what? This last question is not as gratuitous as it may sound. It points
(excuse the pun) to the fact that none of these theorists seems to believe that it is just
8Cooter 2007, p. 449.
9Cooter 2000, p. 368.
10Armstrong 2002, p. 197.
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others. So, in fact, despite themselves, they place power in a hierarchy. Some powers
are more powerful than others, it seems. And so we are straight back to imbalances of
power and their effects. But if we accept Cooter’s approach, we are in a worse position
than before. At least the ‘old’social history of medicine acknowledged that there can be,
and are, power imbalances in the social world that are related to knowledge claims about
reality. The proposed new history of medicine leaves this unexamined regarding its own
theoretical position.
Take, for instance, Cooter’s criticism of Jenner and Taithe.
11 I agree with them regard-
ing the ‘new history of the body’. This is indeed ‘all too often a historiography largely
devoid of tenderness, of affect, and indeed of respect’.
12 Cooter accuses them of a
‘naively realist historical practice that comforts itself in sentimental siding with the
silenced’. But this is unjustly dismissive. Paulo Palladino, whom Cooter cites in a footnote,
responded to Jenner and Taithe that ‘a more ethical and politically reﬂective engagement
with the silenced might instead begin with the historian’s acknowledgement of the
power of the hegemonic discourse that silenced them in the ﬁrst place’.
13 This is
clearly paternalistic towards whoever the people are whom he calls ‘the silenced’.
Worse still, the problem with Palladino’s statement is that he, and others it seems, are
so enamoured with the intellectual ins-and-outs of the ‘hegemonic discourse’ that they
have forgotten all about engaging with ‘the silenced’ at all. What use is that to
anyone but themselves? And besides, Palladino and others seem to think they know
so much more about the ‘hegemonic discourse’ than any of the so-called ‘silenced’.
All of which more likely amounts to a double silencing, doesn’t it?
On the one hand, terms like ‘oppression’, ‘society’ and so on are habitually dismissed as
wholly lacking in analytical rigour; on the other, massively embracing terms like ‘the
Enlightenment’, ‘the modern episteme’, ‘hegemonic discourse’ are bandied around as
if somehow they are more cogent. I am afraid this smacks more of institutional fashion
than of analytical progress. And it is worth noting that ‘progress’ is exactly what is
implied by the substitution of terms in this way. I am not at all sure that I accept the
general notion of ‘progress’, but wouldn’t Cooter call me naive if I said I did? Besides,
isn’t this concept of ‘progress’supposed to be something to do with the ‘Enlightenment’?
And doesn’t he attack the social history of medicine for not freeing itself from ‘Enlight-
enment’ discourse?
My annoyance with this sort of wielding of power by theorists relates directly to what
I see as the crucial issue regarding Cooter’s demand that ‘medico-centric historians’
re-focus on ‘the body’. He describes this necessary attention to ‘the body’ in terms of
power, its penetration of everything and, hence, its dispersal of all conceptual solidity.
The power/knowledge couplet is deployed, and like others, Cooter chooses to emphasise
only one side of it—power. This emphasis serves to deny and replace any other under-
standing of power. Thus, to attempt to confront imbalances of power, for example, in
the care and treatment of aged people, or of people called learning disabled, is likely
11Cooter 2007, p. 444.
12Ibid.
13Palladino 2001, p. 549.
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silenced’. Not only that, it will be to draw the accusation of intellectual naivety about the
pre-eminent role and nature of power as producer of reality. But why don’t we emphasise
the other side of the power/knowledge couplet with regard to the manoeuvre that is
going on here? From my perspective, what Cooter is really talking about is knowledge.
In my view, what he is essentially doing, with this refocus on the body, is switching the
basis of knowledge; or rather, he is swinging the pendulum across to one extreme.
The effect of this is to deny to individuals in general any authority of knowledge about
themselves or, to use Cooter’s description of what power/knowledge constructs, their
knowledge of their own ‘experience, meaning and understanding of life’. The descrip-
tions of ‘the body’ that follow this theory are inevitably placed in authoritative contradis-
tinction to any particular individual’s experience of themselves. As in the responses to
Jenner and Taithe, what this does is produce another, and extremely large group of
‘the silenced’. Bluntly, it shuts people up. It does not allow people to speak. What any
particular person’s life and experience counts as is left in the hands of the people who
wield this theory. We are back to imbalances of power again. And, as I said before,
this is a worse position than the ‘old’ social history of medicine which, for all its faults,
at least recognised that there are power imbalances in the social world that are related
to knowledge claims about reality. It comes down to this: will the (newly deﬁned)
‘medico-centric historians’ who are to be the ‘experts’ who wield Cooter’s proposed
approach, treat people and their opinions about themselves, as potential sources of
knowledge about ‘the body’ (‘the self’, and so on) and the world, or is the individual
never to be approached as anything other than solely a target for the theory that they
hold? To me, it seems like the latter.
The reason I talk about ‘medico-centric historians’ as ‘experts’ who wield Cooter’s
Foucauldian style theoretical approach is because that is what he suggests. He may
want to trash the social history of medicine as a discipline but he nevertheless believes
that a new breed of medico-centric historians need to reengage with the ‘contemporary
bio-centric world’. And they need to do it with this Foucauldian style theory of biopower
that Cooter proposes. According to him, power/knowledge ‘makes up’ our ‘“biosocial”
or somatic—body-centred—culture’.
14 This connects with his view that,
...we are probably at the most important crossroads in the history of thought since
the seventeenth century, and at the most profound shift in the political-economic
organisation of the world since early industrialisation and state foundation, and—
crucial here—the biomedicine and biosocial processes are deeply implicated in
both.
15
Since we are at this fundamental shift in thought, and since Foucault has revealed how
power/knowledge is the basis of the biomedicine and biopolitics that appear to be at the
heart of it, there is clearly a great need to bring together medical historians with a
Foucauldian style theory of power/knowledge, and direct them pre-eminently to the
issues of the biosciences and biopolitics. I noted earlier that I think there are very good
14Cooter 2007, p. 449.
15Cooter 2007, p. 442.
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justify such attention on the back of this theory of power/knowledge, nor any reason
to restrict the focus of medical historians to such areas by making other foci seem illegi-
timate. Besides, this reduction mirrors the reductionism of the bio-sciences that I thought
Cooter was keen to criticise. He says that:
Unlike the plummeting share price of social history, the exchange value of intellec-
tual engagement with biopower, biopolitics and ‘posthuman medicine’ is steeply
rising—and deservedly so. Crucially, these projects matter as never before in
human history, and those with training in the history of medicine have the expertise
to help make sense of them. Who else, after all, is so experienced at teasing out the
contingencies around the material and intellectual making of the body?
16
This is to be, then, the history of medicine at a higher turn of the screw. It is no longer the
social history of medicine, but the practice of medico-centric historians, armed with a
theory of power/knowledge, and directing their ‘expertise’ to the biosciences and biopo-
litics. Is this a postmodernist response to the postmodern predicament, as Cooter
suggests? I don’t think so. It is all too modern. He decries ‘the disciplines’ but it is a dis-
ciplinary battle by any other name. One of the areas of the social history of medicine that
Cooter surely dismisses along with the rest was the attempt to expose the largely hidden
politics of professions and professional self-interest.
17 We are told often enough, and
with justiﬁcation, that the analysis of professional self-interest, or professional ‘interest
groups’, has been punched through with holes in its conceptual apparatus. But
perhaps it isn’t simply ready for the dustbin just yet? Those still residing in the medical
history profession years after the radical assault has lost its power can now happily ask
themselves, thanks to Cooter, how can we retain our power in the market place? How
can we retain some place in the social and professional hierarchy? And, apparently,
not a blush need be seen.
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